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ARTICLESI
International Trade Relations and the




"Economic diplomacy" has acquired an increased prominence in the
post Cold War era. U.S. national security policy no longer focuses
primarily on the conventional notions relating to the use of force, arms
control and arms proliferation, national defense, and superpower conflict.
Rather, the increasing emphasis is on national economic power in a
diffuse global economy.2 It is claimed that this policy focus constitutes
*Partner with the firm of Braverman & Linarelli, Arlington, Va. Lecturer at the Catholic
University of America Columbus School of Law; B.A. 1981 Duquesne University; J.D. 1985 The
American University Washington College of Law.
1. With the fundamental changes in the post-Cold War era, the U.S. national
interest also has shifted. Economics is increasingly at the forefront of our
foreign policy. Economic growth and development, spurred by open markets
and increasing economic integration, are critical to U.S. objectives of
promoting peace and democracy in the post-Cold War period.
Joan E. Spero, Economics and Foreign Policy: The New Pacific Community, Address before the Asia
Foundation (Sept. 21, 1993), in 4 DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. II, 1993. See also Mortimer B.
Zuckerman, The Limits to Leadership, 117 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 12, 1994, No. 10, at
96; Joan E. Spero, Undersecretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Economic Diplomacy:
Key to Domestic Prosperity, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy,
Trade, Oceans and Environment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (May 27, 1993), in 4
DEP'T ST. BULL., June 14, 1993; President William Clinton, American Leadership and Global
Change, Address at the Centennial Celebration, The American University, Washington, D.C. (Feb.
26, 1993), in 4 DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. I, 1993.
2. See generally WAYNE SANDHOLTZ ET AL., THE HIGHEST STAKES: THE ECONOMIC
FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEXT SECURITY SYSTEM (1992). Cf Walter F. Mondale, Beyond Detente:
Toward International Economic Security, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 1-2 (1974).
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a post-Cold War approach at dynamically connecting policies on domestic
economic growth to international relations with foreign nations.3
Trade has dominated the foreign policy agenda of the executive
branch, regardless of whether a Republican or Democrat holds the
presidency. Both Presidents Bush and Clinton, for example, vigorously
pursued the completion of the North American Free Trade Agreement
[hereinafter NAFTA]4 and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade.5 Moreover, trade has dominated the relationship
between the United States and it major allies. Consequently, despite
occasional anti-trade rhetoric from some members of Congress and others,
free trade, at least in theory, has become a paradigm in executive branch
policy.
3. Michael Kantor, Trade Central to America's Future in the World, Address Before the
National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (May 5, 1993), in 4 DEP'T ST. BULL., May 17, 1993. As
Mr. Kantor has explained:
Gone are the days when this nation could subordinate trade concerns to "national security"
in the traditional sense of the term. The strategy of containment was appropriate during
the Cold War, but it was a static strategy, aimed at halting Soviet expansionism. In those
years, we worried about the "doomsday clock" - with hands perilously close to the
midnight of nuclear war. For a long time, our strategy was mutually assured destruction.
Today our challenges are dynamic, not static. Economic strength, founded on
human resources and nourished by trade, is a pillar of national security in this new Post-
Cold War age. Our security interests - and those of others - are inextricably linked to
the growth and fairness of the global trading system.
Id.
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
NAFTA is a significant trade agreement, involving a market of over $6 trillion and 360 million
consumers. William A. Orae, Jr., The NAFTA Debate: Myth Versus Facts: The Whole Truth About
the Half-Truths, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 3 (1993). While NAFTA, as foreign policy, generated very
little in the way of concern or attention by any significant constituency, NAFTA may have been a
significant act of foreign policy. As explained by Congressman Jim Kolbe:
Since President Salinas has taken office, Mexico has extended a hand of cooperation
to the United States. It has dismantled a state-owned economy, has defended human
rights, and embarked upon a path of steady political liberalization.
By successfully implementing NAFTA, the United States will solidify and further
enhance the Salinas vision ofperestroika and glasnost. And as its economy expands and
its middle class grows, Mexico will continue along its path of increased democratization.
The North American Free Trade Agreement: Environment and Labor Agreements: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomms. on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment and Western Hemisphere Affairs
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1993). As explained by
Congressman Bill Richardson:
[O]n foreign policy grounds, I could think of no more serious setback in our relationship
to Latin America than a denial of NAFTA or a delay of NAFTA to President Salinas.
It would be a trip wire negative effect for the rest of the hemisphere, where Chile and
many other nations want to proceed with free trade. It is the wave of the future.
Id. at 2 1. See also Paul Krugman, The NAFTA Debate: The Uncomfortable Truth about NAFTA:
It's Foreign Policy, Stupid, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 13, 18-19 (1993).
5. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 i.L.M. 1125.
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It would appear that the President would require great flexibility in
international trade matters, as there may often be a need to use the tools
of economic diplomacy to respond to international situations and crises.
The methods of implementing trade policy that have been used to a
significant extent throughout U.S. history are the granting of most-
favored-nation status, the negotiation of trade agreements, export controls
and the imposition of economic sanctions.6 Can the President, however,
grant Cuba or North Korea most favored nation status or other trade
concessions in exchange for, say, concessions on nuclear non-
proliferation, or to stop intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring
states? Furthermore, could the President pursue a policy of constructive
engagement through the negotiation of a trade agreement, without
congressional involvement? What is the President's constitutional
authority to regulate international trade as an incident to or in conjunction
with foreign policy generally?
Constitutional law, specifically the separation of powers doctrine,
should direct which branch-Congress or the President-has preeminence
in determining and implementing foreign policy. Historically, however,
trade policy has not been the subject of major constitutional confrontation
between the political branches. Rather, most constitutional confrontations
have arisen from issues regarding the use of military force. Nevertheless,
as trade becomes more prominent as a foreign policy issue, constitutional
battles in the trade area may become more frequent. Such battles will
inevitably occur if the President were to attempt to act either without
congressional approval or without a congressional delegation of authority.
Congress has express powers in the Constitution to regulate tariffs
and foreign commerce." On occasion, however, Congress has delegated
significant aspects of this constitutional authority to the President.' One
6. In fact, most recently, the House of Representatives favored denying most-favored trade
status to China in an attempt to pressure it to improve its human rights practices. See H.R. REP. No.
640, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
8. The delegation doctrine is a corollary to the separation of powers doctrine. U.S. v. Yoshida
Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 572 (C.C.P.A. 1975). To the extent powers are separated between Congress
and the President, Congress may delegate certain of its powers to the President. Since 1813,
decisions in the international trade area have dealt with the parameters of permissible delegation by
Congress to the President in matters involving foreign commerce. See Cargo of Brig Aurora, Bum
Side v. U.S., II U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). Although the Supreme Court sets forth the most
important precedent on constitutional issues, many of the decisions addressing the delegation doctrine
are by lower courts with special jurisdiction in international trade matters. See, e.g., Florsheim Shoe
Co. v. U.S., 744 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1984); Mast Industries v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984); U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 544 F. Supp. 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982);
U.S. v. Yoshida Int'l Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975); South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading
Corp. v. U.S., 334 F.2d 622 (CI. Ct. 1964); Star Kist Foods, Inc. v. U.S., 275 F.2d 472, 480
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such delegation is in legislation that confers to the President the power
to impose economic sanctions upon other countries.9 At the same time,
however, this legislation also limits the President's use of the delegated
authority.'" Additionally, in the area of trade agreements, Congress has
historically passed legislation delegating to the President the authority to
negotiate specific trade agreements. Nevertheless, Congress has limited
its delegation to negotiate trade agreements. Specifically, since 1974,
Congress has imposed the fast track procedure upon the President for
approval of trade agreements." Congress also has promulgated the
(C.C.P.A. 1959).
One standard for determining whether a delegation is proper, the intelligible principle standard,
was first set forth in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Company v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), in which
the Supreme Court upheld a delegation of power to the President to increase or decrease duties.
Specifically, the Court held that "[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." Id. at 409. This standard has
been relied upon in numerous subsequent decisions. The Hampton Court further said that:
The same principle that permits Congress to exercise its rate-making power in interstate
commerce, by declaring the rule which shall prevail in the legislative fixing of rates, and
enables it to remit to a rate-making body created in accordance with its provisions for the
fixing of such rates, justifies a similar provision for the fixing of customs duties on
imported merchandise.
Id. at 409. Thus, the Court made no distinction between interstate or domestic commerce and
international or foreign commerce. Note that Hampton was decided in 1928, eight years before the
Supreme Court's 1936 decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936).
In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Sutherland, set forth one of the
most famous statements of the inherent power of the Executive in foreign affairs in the Court's
history. The Curtiss-Wright Court explained that the Executive has far greater powers in matters of
international concern than it does in matters of domestic concern. Id. at 319. See infra notes 157-58,
192-96 and accompanying text. Decisions after Curtiss-Wright have held that delegations grant even
more authority and will be given even more deference when foreign affairs are implicated. See
Florsheim Shoe, 744 F.2d at 793; Yoshida lnt 1, 526 F.2d at 582; Star Kist Foods, 275 F.2d at 480;
South Puerto Rico Sugar, 334 F.2d at 63 1.
The last invalidation of a delegation as unconstitutional occurred in 1935, prior to Curtiss-
Wright. Notably, the case, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935),
dealt with purely domestic issues. Cf National Cable Television Ass'n. Inc. v. U.S., 415 U.S. 352,
353-55 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the delegation doctrine is an outmoded doctrine
of the 1930s, except in the area of rights in the criminal context); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21, 91 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Bank Secrecy Act reporting and
recordkeeping requirements constituted impermissibly broad delegation).
9. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
II. See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text. On December 1, 1994, Congress passed
important legislation implementing the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In that legislation, Congress legislatively delegated to the
President the power to enter into the agreements and promised to use the fast track procedure to
initiate legislation for the agreement. See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
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Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 2 which prohibits the President from
granting most favored nation status to countries with nonmarket
economies that restrict the freedom of emigration of its nationals.13 The
Amendment has proven at times to be a significant limitation on
Presidential authority since its inception in 1974.'
4
Thus, Congress has placed, or at least has attempted to place,
significant restrictions on Presidential authority in trade matters. This
article examines whether the President may ignore these limitations and
still act in a constitutional manner. In essence, this article assesses when
the President may abandon political compromise with the Congress,
declare trade relations with a particular country or region to be a national
security priority, and enter into a trade agreement or take some other
action in the trade area without congressional involvement. In the last
few decades, the executive branch has chosen the route of expediency and
has not challenged congressional involvement in trade matters.
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether the President has the
constitutional authority to bypass congressional involvement in trade
matters.
Part II of the article examines congressional action in international
trade matters. Throughout history, Congress has delegated broad powers
to the President, but it has in no way abdicated its prerogative over the
regulation of foreign commerce. In fact, Congress has more vigorously
asserted its authority in recent trade legislation by imposing substantial
limitations on the President's authority. Part III of the article contains a
constitutional analysis of presidential authority in trade and foreign policy
matters. The President's constitutional power over pure trade matters has
been determined to be relatively weak. The President, however,
predominates in foreign affairs. Court precedent could be interpreted to
allow the President to recognize a government, institute a blockade, or
even invade a country, on the basis of the President's sole constitutional
authority and without a congressional delegation of power, but not to
decrease a trade barrier as a part of a peaceful settlement. Finally, Part
IV of the article attempts some general conclusions on separation of
powers arguments in international trade matters.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1988).
13. The Amendment as it is currently applied has been a constant irritant in relations between
the United States and the People's Republic of China. See China: Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
and U.S. Policy on the Chinas, 87 PROC. AMER. SOC'Y INT'L L. 432 (1993). See also infra notes
108-16 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
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II. Congressional Assertions of Power
An historical examination of the congressional and executive
involvement in trade matters reveals that Congress and the President
shared power with no apparent conflict prior to 1930. Indeed, the
President took the initiative in entering commercial treaties with foreign
governments, while Congress set tariffs and passed legislation to
implement the various embargoes and blockades of the time.'5 In 1930,
Congress passed the Smoot Hawley Tariff Act, which imposed extremely
high tariffs and contributed to the beginning of the Great Depression. 6
Then, from 1934 to 1962, Congress acquiesced to the President, and the
President enjoyed significant leverage in trade matters, without significant
congressional interference. 7 From 1962 to 1974, however, Congress
began imposing itself on Presidential initiative, and from 1974 to the
present, Congress has asserted dominance in international trade matters,
involving itself in even the early stages of negotiation of trade
agreements.18
A. Early Practice
From 1778 until the passage of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, the primary vehicle for trade relations between the United
States and other countries were bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce,
and navigation, all of which were negotiated and entered into by the
President.' 9 As treaties, they required the final advice and consent of
the Senate. 2' The President, however, did not seek advance approval or
involvement of either house of Congress while negotiating these
21treaties.
The United States entered the first of such commercial treaties with
France in 1778.22 This treaty was not entered into by the President, but
rather was entered when the country was a confederation under the
15. See infra part II.A.
16. See infra part ll.B.
17. See infra part II.C.
18. See infra parts II.D, II.E.
19. TSUNG-YU SZE, CHINA AND THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE, 11-29 (1925); Paul
Lansing & Eric C. Rose, The Granting and Suspension of Most-Favored-Nation Statusfor Nonmarket
Economy States: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 328, 333-34 (1984).
20. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 ("He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.").
21. TSUNG-YU SZE, supra note 19, at 11-29.
22. Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States and France, 8 Stat. 12, T.S. No.
83 (1778), reprinted in 2 BRUCE E. CLUBB, UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE LAW 7-20 (1991).
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Articles of Confederation." Accordingly, the Continental Congress
entered into the treaty with France.24
The President developed a substantial treaty practice in the trade area
prior to the beginnings of congressional regulation of trade agreements,
specifically The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.25 In these
pre-1934 bilateral commercial treaties, the United States used the
conditional most-favored-nation (MFN) 26 clause. 27  Conditional MFN,
which was developed by the United States, was a significant departure
from European practice.28 The United States entered into treaties
specifying conditional MFN until 1923, at which time the President began
to enter treaties containing unconditional MFN clauses.29
Parallel with the use of commercial treaties by the President,
Congress from 1789 to 1930 exercised plenary power in regulating tariffs.
Accordingly, the second trade act passed by the Congress 30 was a tariff
23. 2 CLUBB, supra note 22, at 7.
24. Id.
25. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 appears to be the first comprehensive
legislation in which the Congress attempted to regulate the powers of the President in the making of
trade agreements with other countries. See infra notes 43-74 and accompanying text. It would be
an interesting point for future research to determine when, why, and how the United States stopped
using treaties and began using agreements. Such research is beyond the scope of this Article. This
author suspects that the change occurred with the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
26. Hereinafter "MFN."
27. See Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 333. The most-favored-nation (MFN) provisions
have been generally described as obligating parties "to extend all concessions or favors made by each
in the past, or which might be made in the future to ... any other state in such a way that their
mutual trade will never be on a less favorable basis than is enjoyed by that state whose commercial
relations with each in on the most favorable basis." R. SNYDER, THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION
CLAUSE 10 (1948), quoted in Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 331-32. As for the difference
between conditional and unconditional MFN:
In its pristine form, the most-favored-nation (MFN) concept embodies a broad
nondiscrimination principle: countries linked by a MFN obligation will not treat each
other worse (in terms of trade barriers) than they treat any other country. In the years
before GAIT, most bilateral trade treaties included MFN clauses that committed the
signatories to extend to each other any trade concessions (typically lower tariffs)
subsequently ceded to any other state. This core obligation was subject to competing
interpretations. Developing countries, especially the nineteenth-century United States,
limited their MFN commitments by insisting that the extension ofa subsequent concession
to a MFN partner was conditional on that partner's providing compensating concessions.
Developed countries, particularly the United Kingdom and (after World War I) the United
States, insisted on unconditional MFN obligations that would kick in whenever a trade
concession occurred.
PAUL B. STEPHAN III ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMics LAW AND POLICY 667
(1993).
28. TSUNG-YU SZE, supra note 19, at 18.
29. See STEPHAN ET AL. supra note 27, at 667 (explaining that conditional MFN was used until
after World War I); TSUNG-YU SZE, supra note 19, at 18-19; Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 333.
30. See 2 CLUBB, supra note 22, at 21.
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act, in which Congress promulgated duties "necessary for the support of
government, for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and the
encouragement and protections of manufacturers . . . ." Subsequent
tariff legislation was enacted, culminating in the now infamous Smoot
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.32 Congress also passed legislation
implementing various blockades and embargoes.33
Thus, in the period from the founding of the country to the Great
Depression, both Congress and the President had roles in the development
of trade policy. The President took the initiative and negotiated
commercial treaties with many countries. 4 These treaties often required
the passage of legislation to carry them into effect." Congress, on the
other hand, enacted general legislation implementing tariffs and duties,
and other trade legislation.36 In this early period, there does not appear
to have arisen much direct conflict between the two branches.
B. The Smoot Hawley Tariff Act of 1930
It became painfully obvious through the experience of The Smoot
Hawley Tariff Act of 19303" that Congress could no longer engage in
direct tariff regulation. The Smoot Hawley Tariff Act was the ultimate
protectionist legislation passed by Congress.38 In the Act, Congress did
not delegate any of its powers in the foreign commerce area to the
President.39 Congress set very high tariff levels, manifesting a policy
31. Act of July 4, 1789, 1 Stat. 23 (1789), reprinted in 2 CLUBB, supra note 15, at 21-25.
32. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
33. See 2 CLUBB, supra note 22, at 31-65.
34. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
35. In the 1800s, two Supreme Court decisions set forth important principles on the
interpretation of treaties in U.S. domestic law. These decisions concerned commercial treaties
granting MFN status. Specifically, the Court held in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888),
and Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116 (1887), that (i) as between a self-executing treaty and
legislation, the later in time must control; and (2) if a treaty is not self-executing, its implementing
legislation is treated as any other legislation, which is subject to repeal or revision by Congress. The
Court in Whitney and Bartram reconciled potential conflicts by setting forth these rules and by
confirming the conditional nature of the treaties.
36. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
37. The Smoot Hawley Tariff Act, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
38. Under the Smoot Hawley Tariff Act, Congress set the highest tariff levels in U.S. history.
Harold E. Koh, The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 201 (1987) [hereinafter Legal
Markets of International Trade].
39. Professor Harold Koh has written several articles that set forth an historical analysis of
congressional assertions of power in the international trade area. See Harold H. Koh, The Fast
Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 Brook. J. Int'l L. 183 (1992) [hereinafter The Fast Track];
The Legal Markets of International Trade, supra note 38; Harold H. Koh, Congressional Controls
on Presidential Trade Policymaking After INS. v. Chadha, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191 (1986)
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of extreme protectionism.4" Other countries also set very high tariffs,
and the result was a severe shrinkage of world trade.4' Smoot Hawley
demonstrated the difficulties in having a legislative body, whose members
owe allegiance to regions and factions, micro-manage international trade
for a country. In fact, many view the Smoot Hawley Act as one of the
primary causes of the Great Depression.42 The Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934 was passed in an attempt to rectify the dire
situation.
C. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and Subsequent
Extensions
An uncontrollable Congress recognized the folly of placing itself in
the position of managing the international trade affairs of the nation. As
a result of the disastrous consequences of The Smoot Hawley Tariff Act
of 1930, Congress wanted to increase exports of U.S. products. To do
so, tariff levels of other countries had to be reduced. Accordingly,
Congress enacted The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 193 443 to
delegate to the President the authority to negotiate and conclude
reciprocal tariff-cutting executive agreements with foreign nations.44
The Act has been viewed as successful, at least in comparison to the
disastrous Smoot Hawley regime.4" In fact, it is viewed as the
"beginning of the modem trade agreements era.
46
During the period from 1934 to 1962, on eleven occasions, Congress
extended the Act to apply to various trade contexts.47 It appears that
from the beginning of this modem era, at least until 1962, the President
had the predominant authority in trade matters. The Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934, as extended, gave the President the initiative in
[hereinafter Congressional Controls After INS. v. Chadha]. Professor Koh analyzes congressional
action in five regimes. The first regime is the "Smoot Hawley regime," in which Congress managed
tariff levels and trade, with no authority delegated to the President.
40. The Legal Markets of International Trade, supra note 38, at 202; Congressional Controls
After I.N.S. v. Chadha, supra note 39, at 1995-97.
41. The Legal Markets of International Trade, supra note 38, at 201-02.
42. The Legal Markets of International Trade, supra note 38, at 202; Congressional Controls
After I.N.S. v. Chadha, supra note 39, at 1995-97.
43. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
44. The Legal Markets of International Trade, supra note 38, at 202; Congressional Controls
After INS. v. Chadha, supra note 39, at 1195-97. Professor Koh classifies the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act and its extensions as the second regime of congressional action in trade matters.
45. Congressional Controls After INS. v. Chadha, supra note 39, at 1196.
46. 2 CLUBB, supra note 22, at 151.
47. See EUGENE L. STEWART, THE TRADE AGREEMENTS LEGISLATION, COMPENDIUM OF
PAPERS ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE POLICY 507 (1957).
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international trade matters. The Act contained a broad delegation of
power granted to the President.4' This delegation augmented the
President's already broad powers in foreign affairs established
independently in the Constitution. 49 The Act provided in pertinent part:
[T]he President, whenever he finds as a fact, that any existing duties
or other import restrictions of the United States or any foreign
country are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the
United States and that the purpose above declared will be promoted
by the means hereinafter specified, is authorized from time to time -
(1) To enter into foreign trade agreements with
foreign governments or instrumentalities thereof; and
(2) To proclaim such modifications of existing duties and
other import restrictions, or such additional import restrictions,
or such continuance, and for such minimum periods, of existing
customs or excise treatment of any article covered by foreign
trade agreements, as are required or appropriate to carry out any
foreign trade agreement that the President has entered into
hereunder. °
One notable feature of the Act is the proclamation powers of the
President. It has been asserted that this power gave the President the
ability to proclaim an agreement as domestic law." To appreciate the
broad scope of this delegation, one need only review the detailed
provisions of contemporary fast track legislation governing the NAFTA
and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
in which Congress has asserted a far more dominant position in trade
matters. 2
The ostensible purposes of the Act were to alleviate a temporary
emergency situation 3.5  The Act contained very few substantive
48. Legal Markets of International Trade, supra note 38, at 202; Congressional Controls After
I.N.S. v. Chadha, supra note 39, at 1195.
49. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
50. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, § 350(a), 48 Stat. 943
(1934). "Duties and other import restrictions" were defined as including (1) "rate and form of import
duties and classification of articles," and (2) "limitations, prohibitions, charges, and exactions other
than duties, imposed on importation or imposed for the regulation of imports." Id. § 350(c). This
definition did not change very much in subsequent 1962 legislation. See infra note 79 and
accompanying text.
5I. John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic
Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 250, 281-85 (1967).
52. See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
53. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
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standards that could be applied to restrict Presidential discretion.54 The
President exercised hegemony over trade matters and Congress abdicated.
This separation of powers interplay, however, should be interpreted in the
context of the times. The legislative history for the original Act could be
read to indicate that its purpose was to assist the 6ountry out of the Great
Depression by expanding export markets." During the Great
Depression, a President that actively decreased tariffs abroad was seen as
vital to domestic economic recovery. Similarly, a strong and efficient
presidential presence in international trade matters was also perceived as
necessary when the Act was extended to apply to other world situations
and crises, such as post-World War II efforts to rebuild countries and to
develop world economic cooperation or the handling of the Cold War.56
The President negotiated and entered into twenty-one agreements
before 1940 and thirty-two agreements before 1945. s  With the
exception of one agreement, these agreements were all bilateral.5"
Notably, the Act was read broadly to encompass virtually any type of
matter involving international trade, yet Congress never objected to
executive branch practice in this respect. 9
Finally, in 1947, the President negotiated the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade Act [hereinafter GATT],6  without doubt one of the
most significant trade agreements ever made.6' GATT, however, was
never specifically approved or reviewed by either house of Congress.62
Rather, the United States agreed to adhere to the GATT after an
authorized executive branch official signed a document titled "The Final
Act and Protocol of Provisional Application" and the President then
issued a proclamation for the Act.63 The executive branch has not
54. The basic limitation was that the President could not alter duties by more than 50%. Id.
55. See STEWART, supra note 47, at 507.
56. Id.
57. Jackson, supra note 51, at 257, 264; Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 334.
58. Jackson supra note 51, at 258.
59. Id. at 260-65.
60. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATl].
61. Jackson, supra note 51, at 250-51; Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 334-37. Originally,
23 nations were signatories to the treaty. 2 CLUBB, supra note 22, at 174. The GATT was the first
multilateral agreement of consequence, and it signalled a fundamental change from the United States'
previous approach to trade relations, which were effected primarily through bilateral trade
agreements. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
62. Jackson, supra note 51, at 265; 2 CLUBB, supra note 22, at 174.
63. 2 CLUBB, supra note 22, at 174. See also supra note 51 (discussing the proclamation
powers of the President). Although the President wanted the creation of the International Trade
Organization (ITO) as the organization to administer GATr, the ITO never came into existence
because of a lack of congressional support. As explained by Professor John Jackson, "[tihe
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always been entirely clear on whether its authority for its acceptance of
the GATT is based on either delegated authority or a combination of
delegated authority and the independent constitutional authority of the
President.64 Under either theory, however, the executive branch has
contended that it was not required to submit the GATT to Congress.65
Thus, while Congress played, at best, a very minor role in the initial
approval of GATT, it nevertheless has accepted GATT and in fact has
sought to delimit the President's authority in negotiating successive
rounds to the GATT.66  After GATT was negotiated, Congress
continued to extend The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act another six
times." The 1951 Extension Act contained the following provision
concerning GATT, which was repeated in the 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1958
extensions of the Act:68 "The enactment of this Act shall not be
construed to determine or indicate the approval or disapproval by the
Congress of the Executive Agreement known as the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. 69 This reaction was one of the weakest Congress
could take. Congress did not attempt to pass legislation to. effectively
repeal GATT, but rather, continued to grant the President authority to
enter into further trade agreements.
While in general, The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act affords
broad authority to the President, the Act and its extensions nevertheless
contained some limitations by which Congress sought to control the
initiative of the President. For example, a significant provision in the
1951 extension of the Act was the direction to the President to withdraw
MFN status for virtually all communist countries.70 Congress imposed
Administration had repeatedly stated to Congress that, while GATT was being negotiated pursuant
to authority which the executive already possessed, the ITO would be submitted to Congress for
approval." Jackson, supra note 51, at 252, n. 13. The Congress rejected the ITO. Id.
64. Id. at 254. As explained by one author:
A protocol of provisional application made it unnecessary to change any U.S. Laws to
comply with the GATT, and so the President's authority to enter into it could not be
challenged effectively either in the Congress or the courts. Nonetheless, many legislatures
believed that in making such a broad agreement on regulatory matters, the President had
exceeded the authority granted him in the Trade Agreement Extension Act.
2 CLUBB, suipra note 22, at 174.
65. Id. at 265.
66. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
67. Jackson, supra note 5 I, at 265-69; STEWART, supra note 47, at 507-20.
68. Jackson, supra note 51, at 267.
69. The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 72 (1951), reprinted in Jackson,
supra note 5 I, at 267.
70. See H.R. REP. 575, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. at 1 (1994) (discussing the U.S. history of MFN
treatment); Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 388. The result was that MFN status was revoked
from Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 388.
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the higher duty rates of the Smoot Hawley Tariff Act on Communist
countries.71 This 1951 provision was the first MFN restriction on
communist states, and was the precursor to the Jackson Vanik
Amendment found in the 1974 Trade Act.72
From a procedural perspective, the Act imposed a notice requirement
on the President, which required him to furnish "reasonable public
notice" of his intention to negotiate a trade agreement, so that "any
interested person" may have an opportunity to present his views. 73 This
notice requirement is significantly less onerous than the procedural
requirements of the current fast track legislation.74
D. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962
From 1962 through 1967, Congress', delegation to the President of
the authority to enter into trade agreements was embodied in The Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. 75 Under this legislation, Congress sought to
inject itself into the process of trade negotiations through the requirement
that the President obtain congressional approval for multilateral trade
agreements. Congress delegated powers to negotiate trade matters to the
President, but required congressional approval of trade agreements.76
Underlying this restriction was Congress' concern that the President
might agree to reduce nontariff barriers, such as antidumping restrictions,
during the Kennedy Round of the GATT.
77
One legal scholar has explained Congress' concern as follows:
Such nontariff concessions not only potentially threatened domestic
antidumping laws, which congressmen guarded zealously, but on their
face, nontariff restrictions also seemed to fall outside Congress'
constitutionally enumerated power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises." Thus Congress feared that a runaway President
71. Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 338.
72. Id. at 338-39.
73. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, § 4, 48 Stat. 943
(1934); The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, § 3, 65 Stat. 70 (1951). By 1951, the
requirement was formalized into a hearing requirement.
74. See infra notes 88-107, 117-20 and accompanying text.
75. The Trade Expansion Act, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962). Professor Koh's third
regime began with the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This third regime corresponds with the
Kennedy Round of the GATI, which concluded in 1967. Legal Markets of International Trade,
supra note 38, at 203-04; Congressional Controls After INS. v. Chadha, supra note 39, at 1197-
1200.
76. See Legal Markets of International Trade, supra note 38, at 203-04; Congressional Controls
After I.N.S. v. Chadha, supra note 39, at 1197-1200.
77. Legal Markets of International Trade, supra note 38, at 203-04; Congressional Controls
After INS. v. Chadha, supra note 39, at 1197-1200.
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might, instead, negotiate and accept nontariff barriers reductions
without congressional authorization, relying upon his independent
constitutional authority to accept sole agreements.78
The Act permitted the President to enter into trade agreements with
foreign governments between June 30, 1962 and July 1, 1967, and to
"proclaim such modification or continuance of any existing duty or other
import restriction, such continuance of existing duty free or excise
treatment, or such additional import restrictions, as he determines to be
required or appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement., 79  Yet,
the Act also contained some substantive restrictions on the President's
authority.8° As in the prior legislation, the President was required to
provide the opportunity for "any interested person" to present his or her
views on a purposed trade agreement, in hearings held after "reasonable
notice.'""
The 1962 Act was the first trade legislation that required that the
President have members of Congress as part of his accredited negotiating
delegation. 2 As did the 1951 Extension Act, the 1962 Act contained
a provision denying the President the discretion to grant MFN status to
communist countries.8 3
78. Congressional Controls After 1N.S. v. Chadha, supra note 39, at 1198. In fact, Congress'
fears were realized. President Johnson accepted the GATT Antidumping Code over congressional
objection, relying on both his congressional delegation of authority and his inherent authority to enter
into sole executive agreements. Id. Congress reacted negatively to President Johnson's action and
attempted passage of a resolution to prohibit the Code from becoming U.S. domestic law. Id. at
1199 n.23. Congress ultimately settled for legislation that allowed the Code to become domestic law
to the extent that it did not contravene the current domestic law already governing antidumping. Id.
See Renegotiation Act Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-634, § 201, 82 Stat. 1345, 1347
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1988)). See also STEPHEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 654 n.20.
79. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 201(a), 76 Stat. 872 (1962).
"Duty or other import restriction" was defined as including (A) the rate and form of an import duty,
and (B) a limitation, prohibition, charge, and exaction other than duty, imposed on importation or
imposed for the regulation of imports. Id. §405(2).
80. See id. § 201(b) (providing that the President could not alter duties by more than 50%).
81. Id. § 223.
82. Section 243 of the 1962 Act provides:
Before each negotiation under this title, the President shall, upon the recommendation of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, select two members (not of the same
political party) of the Committee on Ways and Means, and shall, upon the
recommendation of the President of the Senate, select two members (not of the same
political party) of the Committee on Finance, who shall be accredited as members of the
United States delegation to such negotiation.
Id. §243. The presence of members of Congress in negotiations was to "influence... actions by
leaking damaging information and threatening obstruction. Their participation in the negotiations also
open[ed] an independent channel of information to Congress." STEPHEN ET AL., supra note 27, at
653.
83. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 231, 76 Stat. 872, 876 (1962).
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E. The Trade Act of 1974 and Contemporary Trade Legislation,
Including The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
The provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 are "the foundations for the
current regime of U.S. trade policymaking"84 and have been deemed
"the first comprehensive restructuring of U.S. trade law since 1934.""s
The most significant feature of the 1974 Act was its introduction of the
fast track procedure for congressional approval of international trade
agreements negotiated by the President. 6  Essentially, the fast track
procedure can be viewed as an assertion of congressional dominance in
international trade matters. 7 Also important is the Act's addition of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment to U.S. trade law.
1. The Fast Track Procedure.-The fast track procedure marks the
first time after Smoot Hawley that Congress became significantly
involved in the details of international trade." The fast track procedure
was not just included in the 1974 Trade Act, but has become a more or
less permanent feature in contemporary trade legislation. 9 It seems that
it will play a significant role in contemporary trade legislation, at least for
the near future. It is the subject of current controversy from a separation
of powers perspective.9" As explained in one authoritative text:
The interaction among [federal agencies involved in international
trade matters], other components of the Executive Branch and
In 1965, President Johnson created the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East
European Countries and the Soviet Union, led by Chairman J. Irwin Miller, to assess this restriction.
Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 34 1. The Committee issued a report in 1966 which recommended,
among other things, the linkage of MFN status for Soviet Bloc countries on the basis of political and
foreign policy factors. Id. Specifically, the Committee recommended a repeal of the lack of
discretion in then current law, and instead recommended the vesting of discretion in the President
to grant MFN status to a communist country if to do so would advance the interests of the United
States. Id. at 341 n.75. In 1966, President Johnson unsuccessfully sought legislation from Congress
to implement the Miller Committee's recommendations. Id. at 341 n.76.
84. Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, supra
note 39, at 1201. Professor Koh's fourth regime is the GATT Tokyo Round Regime, for which
Congress delegated power to the President in the Trade Agreements Act of 1974. The Legal Markets
of International Trade, supra note 38, at 205-07; Congressional Controls After INS. v. Chadha,
supra note 39, at 1200-08. See also Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2486 (1988).
85. STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 644.
86. Legal Markets of International Trade, supra note 38, at 205-07; Congressional Controls
After I.N.S v. Chadha, supra note 39, at 1201.
87. Legal Markets of International Trade, supra note 38, at 209.
88. Professor Koh's fourth and fifth regimes are versions of the fast track procedure of the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Id. at 208-10.
89. See, e.g, Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2515 (1988); Omnibus Trade
& Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901-2906 (1988).
90. STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 653.
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Congress is complex and fraught with separation-of-powers issues.
Politicians and scholars have devoted particular attention to
interbranch conflicts inherent in the operation of the fast track
approval mechanism for trade agreements. The 1974 Act cheated this
architecture, which no President has yet found expedient to challenge;
the 1979, 1984 and 1988 trade acts all tinkered with it, generally in
the direction of increasing congressional discretion.9
Set forth herein is a summary description of the fast track procedure,
based on current trade legislation. One caveat to this analysis is that the
current legislation could be amended by the current Congress. At best
what can be provided in this article is an analysis of the basic points that
may be relevant to the constitutional focus of this article. At present, no
fast track authority exists, probably because there are no major trade
agreements under consideration at the present time, with the successful
completion of NAFTA and the GATT Uruguay Round.92  The
President's most recent negotiating authority expired on June 1, 1993,
except for the authority for GATT Uruguay Round, which expired on
April 16, 1994.93 The significance of these time periods is that they
provide authority or delegation from the Congress to the President to
negotiate trade agreements.
The fast track procedure has included notification requirements,
consultation requirements, and submission requirements. The President
has been required to notify both houses of Congress of his intent to enter
into a trade agreement between ninety and 120 days before entering into
the agreement.94 Shortly after providing notice of his intention, the
President has been required to then publish notice in the Federal
Register.95 With respect to bilateral agreements, an additional notice
requirement has been imposed, which has required the President to
provide, at least sixty days before the above notice, a notice to the Senate
Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means of
his intent to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement. 96
The time period created by the above notices allow Congress "to
hold 'nonmarkup' sessions and 'nonhearings,' which it can use to
negotiate the final content of the agreement and the text of the
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 4, 5 and accompanying text.
93. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902(a)-(b), 2902(c) (1988). The President may seek extensions of time, and
either house of Congress may veto the request. See id. § 2903(b)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
94. Id. §§ 2903(a)(1)(A), 2902(e)(3)(A).
95. Id. § 2903(a)(1)(A).
96. Id. § 2902(c)(3)(C)(i).
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implementing bill with the Executive."97  The President has been
required to consult with the House Committee on Ways and Means, the
Senate Committee on Finance and any other committee with jurisdiction
over subjects to be affected by the trade agreement at issue.9" Given the
broad scope of trade agreements today, including among others, such
subjects as labor and the environment, this consultation requirement is
significant.
Upon entering an agreement, the President has been required to
submit the text of the agreement, an implementing bill, and other
documentation to Congress for approval.99 Upon receipt of these
submissions, Congress must, within sixty days, vote on the implementing
bill, making no amendments. 00 At any time during this process,
Congress can terminate the use of fast track procedures if both houses of
Congress pass disapproval resolutions.' In the event that Congress
passes such resolutions, the implementing bill presumably will be treated
as any other bill in the Congress.
Prior legislation, notably the 1962 Act, imposed requirements on the
President to hold public hearings and seek advice from the public.'0 2
Contemporary legislation also contains such provisions. Moreover, as in
the 1962 Act, Congressmen still serve as advisors to the trade delegations
of the President. 3  The fast track procedure, however, imposes
significantly greater procedural requirements on the President, in the
nature of substantially increasing congressional participation in decision
making over international trade matters.
Through the fast track procedure, Congress has been able to assert
control by refraning the constitutional issue. Congress has articulated the
fast track procedure as a matter of its internal rules of procedure.
Congress has the constitutional authority to amend or reject its own
rules. 4 Congress has not characterized the fast track procedure as
implicating the issue of which branch has authority over international
trade matters. 5  Because of this characterization by Congress, the
97. STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 653-54.
98. 19 U.S.C. § 2902(c)(3)(C)(ii)-(d).
99. Id. § 2903(a)(l)(B) (1988).
100. Id. §§ 2191-2192.
101. Id. § 2903(c)(1); STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 654.
102. See supra notes 73, 74 and accompanying text.
103. 19 U.S.C. § 2211 (1988). See also supra notes 82, 83 and accompanying text.
104. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(a) (1988). The Constitution provides that "[elach House [is to] determine
the Rules of its Proceedings." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2. See also STEPHAN ElT AL., supra note
27, at 654; The Fast Track, supra note 39, at 152.
105. See The Fast Track, supra note 39, at 151-52.
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contention is that Congress may reject the procedure or amend its rules
at any time, even in the midst of considering a trade agreement and its
implementing bills."0 6 Congress thus diverts the focus from the key
issue, namely the separation of powers issue of which branch has
authority over international trade matters."0 7
2. The Jackson Vanik Amendment.-After negotiating the Soviet-
American Trade Agreement in 1973,"°' President Nixon introduced in
Congress the Trade Reform Act,0 9 which allowed for unlinked MFN
status with states with nonmarket economies."0 Congress, however,
instead included the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in the Trade Act of
1974."' The Jackson-Vanik Amendment permits the President to
extend MFN status to countries with nonmarket economies if the
President determines that the countries do not violate certain conditions
allowing for freedom of emigration.'' 2
The disagreement between the Congress and the President
concerning the Jackson-Vanik Amendment shows the contours of the
separation of powers debate. The Amendment was promulgated during
the Cold War, when President Nixon was vigorously pursuing a policy
of detente with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc countries."'
Nixon's detente policy included "economic detente," in which he sought
to use trade to advance foreign policy objectives. 114  Thus, Nixon
viewed the Amendment as incompatible with the means used by the
106. STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 654.
107. See The Fast Track, supra note 39, at 151-52.
108. Agreement with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding
Trade, Oct. 18, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 2910, T.I.A.S. No. 7478.
109. H.R. 4767, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
110. Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 341-42. The agreement was not ratified because
Congress did not pass implementing legislation. Id. See also Jessica Kom, Institutional Reforms that
Don'tMatter: Chadha and the Legislative Veto in Jackson-Vanik, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455, 458-
61 (1992); Michael W. Beasley et al., Comment, An Interim Analysis of the Effects of the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment on Trade and Human Rights: The Romanian Example, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 193, 196-97 (1976).
11I. Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 343-44. The Amendment in its current form is located
at 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1988). Congress initially intended the Amendmentto pressure the Soviet Union
to ease its emigration policies applicable to Soviet Jews. Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 343-44.
112. 19 U.S.C. § 2432(c) (1988). The Amendment, however, did not go nearly as far as the
Miller Committee recommendations, which proposed linkage requirements relating to broad foreign
policy and political concerns. Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 343. The Jackson-Vanik
Amendment is applied presently much more broadly than it was intended, as it is applied not only
to emigration requirements but to human rights concerns generally.
113. Kom, supra note 110, at 458-61.
114. Id.
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Executive to implement foreign policy through trade." 5 Nevertheless,
neither Nixon nor any other President, for reasons of expediency, politics
or otherwise, has ever sought to challenge the Amendment as an
unconstitutional restriction on the President's foreign affairs power." 6
3. Other Congressional Assertions of Dominance.-Congress has
imposed several additional restrictions on the President. More than ever
before, contemporary legislation contains detailed substantive objectives
and standards for the President to follow in trade negotiations." 7 One
major restriction on bilateral agreements is that they cannot be entered
into unless a foreign country requests the negotiation of the
agreement. "'
In addition, the President's proclamation powers are currently
significantly curtailed. The President may now only proclaim in the area
of duties. There is no longer statutory proclamation power for "other
import restrictions"." 9  Notably, Congress has delegated significant
authority over tariff issues to the President, but not over non-tariff
issues.2
115. As explained by Jessica Kom:
The interbranch struggle surrounding the enactment of this statute sprang from debates
over the Nixon Administration's policy of detente. The Nixon administration viewed the
trade bill, which authorized the extension of MFN status to communist countries,
"primarily as a vehicle to advance its detente objectives." A variety of forces within
Congress, however, intended to prevent the Nixon administration from unilaterally
implementing detente through trade policy.
Id (quoting Walter F. Mondale, Beyond Detente: Toward International Economic Security, FOREIGN
AFF., Oct. 1974, at 1, 15). See also Lansing & Rose, supra note 19, at 342; Beasley et al., supra
note I10, at 196-97.
116. The substantive debate as to the soundness of the Amendment as policy continues, as even
today, there is debate over the renewal of China's MFN status. Current policies toward China are
similar to the detente policies of the Nixon Administration towards the Soviet Bloc. In 1993,
President Clinton advocated conditionality of China's MFN status on progress on human rights. H.R.
REP. 575, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1994). In 1994, the Clinton Administration took a position
that is similar in substance to President Nixon's detente policy. Id. The Administration currently
implements a "new comprehensive China policy, which seeks to address and balance the host of U.S.
strategic, commercial, political, and human rights interests in China." Id
117. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901 (1988) (outlining "overall and principal trade negotiating
objectives of the United States"); 19 U.S.C. § 2905 (1988) (providing accession of state trading
regimes to GATT).
118. 19 U.S.C. § 2902(c)(3)(B) (1988).
119. Id. § 2902(a)-(b).
120. It is noteworthy that the apparent design of the fast track procedure is that it applies to
"Agreements regarding non-tariff barriers" and "Bilateral Agreements regarding tariff and non-tariff
barriers." Id. §§ 2902(b), (c)-(d); 2903(b).
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F. Export Controls and Sanctions Powers
In numerous statutes, Congress has delegated substantial authority to
the President to impose economic sanctions. 2 ' Two principal laws
apply in national emergencies, namely the Trading with the Enemy
Act'22  and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
123
Moreover, many other statutes exist that deal with economic sanctions,
such as those governing exports from the United States.
124
III. Constitutional Analysis
From the preceding section, one can conclude that, at present,
Congress currently asserts a dominant role in trade matters. Indeed, the
current trend appears to be that Congress takes an increasingly active and
intrusive role, involving itself in the core of decisions on international
trade relations. Some assert, however, that the President has significant
inherent constitutional powers to undertake international trade activities
independent of the powers delegated to the President in trade
legislation.' 25 Thus, there arises the question as to the extent the
President can lawfully act independent of or in conflict with trade
legislation. Consequently, this section examines the President's authority
to act alone despite extensive congressional controls in trade matters.
A. The Text of the Constitution
The threshold analysis centers upon the text of the Constitution.
Specifically, one must determine how the Constitution delineates the
separation of powers in the foreign trade area. The Constitution,
however, provides no easy answers on the permissible scope of powers
of the executive and legislative branches.' 26
1. CongressionalPowers.-The Constitution provides Congress with
many enumerated powers in the international arena.12" While these
121. John P. Giraudo, Waging Economic Warfare; The Sanctions Power Under the Constitution,
N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 935 (1987); See generally BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME (1988).
122. Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-5 (1988).
123. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1988).
124. See CARTER, supra note 121, at 63-98.
125. Giraudo, supra note 121, at 936-38; CARTER, supra note 121, at 209-19.
126. As explained by legal scholar, Professor Karl Llewellyn, a "working constitution" such as
the United States Constitution, is "a living institution built (historically, genetically) in the first
instance around a particular Document," and "[tihe device of enumerating blanket powers leaves the
Document, in appearance, still 'controlling,' despite range or mass of concrete action taken 'under'
them." Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1934).
127. Edwin Marino, Jr., Note, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth v. Office of
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powers often are taken for granted in any analysis of congressional power
in foreign affairs, Congress has at least seven expressly enumerated
powers in foreign affairs, in the following areas: (1) the power to impose
tariffs and duties; 28 (2) the power to regulate foreign commerce;
129
(3) the advice and consent power of the Senate in the treaty process; 130
(4) advice and consent power in the appointments process; 3 ' (5) the
power to declare war;3 2 (6) authority over naturalization;' and (7)
the power to organize and fund military forces for the nation. 3 4  It has
been found that Article I of the Constitution "gives Congress almost all
of the enumerated powers over foreign affairs, and Article II gives the
President almost none of them."'35  Yet, ironically, the President
traditionally has seized the initiative in foreign affairs.
36
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution stipulates that Congress has
the authority to "lay and collect ...Duties, Imposts and Excises"'
13 7
and to "regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations."'38 Congress, under
this same section, also has the authority to "regulate Commerce ...
the United States Trade Representative: Environmentalists, the Courts, and Trade Agreements -
Meritorious Ideas, But Let's Not Forget the Constitution, 39 S.D. L. REv. 204, 220, 221 (1994).
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
129. Id. art. 1, § 8. cl. 3.
130. Article I! of the Constitution, which concerns the executive branch, provides for the
following with respect to presidential power:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, . . . and all other officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and shall be established by Law ....
Id. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2.
131. Id.
132. Under Article 1 of the Constitution, the Congress shall have the power to "declare war, grant
letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water." Id. art. I, §
8, cl. 11.
133. Congress shall have the power to "establish a uniform rule of naturalization ..... U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
134. The Constitution provides in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have the power to ... raise and support armies ... [tlo provide and
maintain a navy ... [t]o make rules for government and regulation of the land and naval
forces... [and t]o provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union,
suppress insurrections and repel invasions.
Id. art. I, § 8, cis. 12-15.
135. Harold H. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the
Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1292 (1988).
136. Id. at 1292-93.
137. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
138. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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among the several States and with the Indian Tribes."' 139  Thus,
Congress has an explicit textual preeminence in matters of commerce.
In contrast, Article II, governing the executive branch, says nothing
about the power of the Executive over either interstate or international
commerce. In fact, Article II, Section 3 merely requires the President to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."'4 ° It is this clause
that has been interpreted as resulting in shared responsibilities or
concurrent powers over matters of international trade.' 4 '
Hardly anything can be found in the documentation relating to the
drafting of the Constitution so as to glean any intent on the separation of
powers in the area of foreign commerce. 4 ' Presumably, this lack of
information is because the significant issues at the time of the
Constitution's drafting were focused on the division of power between the
federal and the state governments in the regulation of commerce, and not
in the separation of powers between Congress and the President. 43
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton, who propounded broad, unenumerated
powers in foreign relations for the President, 144 asserted in The
Federalist that the President "can prescribe no rules concerning the
commerce or currency of the nation," in contrast to the King of Great
Britain, who "is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this
capacity can ... lay embargoes for a limited time.'
' 45
It is important to note that as trade legislation has progressed
throughout the years, Congress appears to have lost interest in the
regulation of tariffs and duties. Indeed, Congress has delegated the most
sweeping powers to the President in the tariff area. 146  The President
does not need fast track authority for multilateral agreements involving
tariff barriers and has been able to retain proclamation powers only for
duties. 147 This loss of interest by Congress coincides with the increase in
focus of trade agreements on nontariff barriers such as subsidies, national
standards, and barriers in public procurement. The paradox is that the
Constitution grants Congress express powers to regulate duties.
139. Id.
140. Id. art. 11, § 3.
141. Jacques J. Gorlin, Foreign Trade and the Constitution, in FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
CONSTITUTION 54 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990).
142. Id. at 56-59.
143. Id.
144. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
145. Gorlin, supra note 141, at 58-59 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton)).
146. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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Congress has attempted to justify fast track legislation on the basis
of the provision in the Constitution that "[e]ach House [is to] determine
the Rules of it proceedings."' 48 This justification results in a tautology.
It seems almost axiomatic to conclude that congressional rules of
procedure must not violate the Constitution, just as rules of procedure for
a court must not violate the Constitution. The contention that fast track
legislation is constitutionally proper simply because it concerns rules of
congressional procedure ignores other substantial and detailed
constitutional provisions and Supreme Court precedent on the separation
of powers. 4 9 Moreover, merely because Congress says that the fast
track legislation modifies its rules does not make it so.
2. Executive Powers.-The President has relatively few enumerated
powers in the Constitution. Indeed, it has fewer enumerated powers than
Congress on matters of international concern. 5 Under Article II of the
Constitution, the President has the following enumerated powers: (1) The
President is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States;"' 5' (2) The President has
"[p]ower, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;"'' 52 (3) The
President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls,"'' 5 3 and (4) The President "shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers.'
5 4
An analysis of the text of the Constitution is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for assessing separation of powers issues. This is
particularly true in foreign affairs, where the President has inherent
authority and unenumerated powers.
B. The Power to Negotiate
One important early step in any trade relations between the United
States and a foreign country is negotiations between government
representatives. Generally, the accepted view is that "the President and
148. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
149. See infra part III.B.
150. See supra notes 128-145 and accompanying text.
151. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 1.
152. Id. § 2, cl. 2.
153. Id.
154. Id. § 3. This is the President's power to recognize foreign governments.
155. See infra part Ili.B.
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his officers can negotiate on any subject at any time."'5 6 Nevertheless,
there has been little judicial discussion of the President's negotiation
powers, except for the much-criticized Supreme Court decision of United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.'57  In Curtiss-Wright, the Court
articulated the following:
Not only ... is the federal power over external affairs in origin
and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but
participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In
this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the
field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great argument of
March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "The President is the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations."'58
156. John H. Jackson, U.S. Constitutional Law Principles and Foreign Trade Law and Policy,
in 8 NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMic LAW 65, 71 (Meinhard Hilf &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 311 cmt. b (1986) ("As the 'sole organ' of the United States in its
international relations ...the President himself has authority to represent the United States in
negotiating or concluding international agreements.").
157. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
158. Id. at 319. The Court continued with the following quote from an 1816 report from the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
The President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to
foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be
most competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be
urged with the greatest prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible under the
Constitution. The committee consider [sic] this responsibility the surest pledge for the
faithful discharge of his duty. They think the interference of the Senate in the direction
of foreign negotiations calculated to diminish that responsibility and thereby to impair the
best security for the national safety. The nature of the transactions with foreign nations,
moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on
secrecy and dispatch.
Id. See also John G. Tower, Congress Versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation
of American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 229 (1981).
It has been asserted that the "sole organ" quote has been relied upon out of context, and that
what Mr. Marshall really was referring to was the President's authority under congressional
delegation. Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical
Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 25 (1983). Professor Lofgren provides the following analysis and
quotation to Mr. Marshall:
Since these words of Marshall have often been quoted, it is worthwhile to put them in
context. At issue was whether President John Adams had acted properly in extraditing
a British subject to England on a murder charge pursuant to the Jay Treaty of 1795. After
the [often quoted] statement, Marshall continued:
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Thus, after Curtiss-Wright, it appears that the President has the
inherent constitutional authority to negotiate international agreements.'59
Yet, no constitutional distinction has been articulated in the "external
realm" for trade agreements. Further, some characterize Curtiss-Wright's
pronouncement of broad executive power in foreign affairs matters as
dicta, since the decision could have rested on a finding that the
President's action in the case before the Court was within the scope of a
congressional delegation. 60 Nevertheless, for the most part, the holding
of Curtiss-Wright is well-recognized and is a part of constitutional
doctrine.
Of consequence, the demand of a foreign nation can only be made on [the
President].
He possesses the whole Executive power. He holds and directs the force
of the nation. Of consequence, any act to be performed by the force of the
nation is to be performed through him.
He is charged to execute the laws. A treaty is declared to be law. He
must then execute a treaty, where he, and he alone, possesses the means of
executing it.
. The treaty, which is a law, enjoins the performance of a particular object.
The person who is to perform this object is marked out by the Constitution,
since the person is named who conducts the foreign intercourse, and is to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. The means by which it is to be
performed, the force of the nations, are in the hands of this person. Ought not
this person to perform the object, although the particular mode of using the
means has not been described? Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the
mode, and Congress may devolve on others the whole execution of the
contract; but, till this be done, it seems the duty of the Executive department
to execute the contract by any means it possesses.
Id. (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. cols. 613-14 (emphasis added)).
159. As explained by Senator John C. Spooner in 1906:
The Senate has nothing to do whatever with the negotiation of treaties or the
conduct of our foreign intercourse and relations save the exercise of the one constitutional
function of advice and consent which the Constitution requires as a precedent condition
to the making of a treaty ....
From the foundation of the Government it has been conceded in practice and in
theory that the Constitution vests the power of negotiation and the various phases - and
they are multifarious - of the conduct of our foreign relations exclusively in the
President. And, Mr. President, he does not exercise that constitutional power, nor can he
be made to do it, under the tutelage or guardianship of the Senate or of the House or of
the Senate and House combined.
I do not deny the power of the Senate . to pass a resolution expressive of its
opinion as to matters of foreign policy. But if it is passed by the Senate or by the House
or by both Houses it is beyond any possible question purely advisory, and not in the
slightest degree binding in law or conscience upon the President ....
Statement of Senator John C. Spooner, 40 CONG. REc. 1417-20 (1906), reprinted in JOHN NORTON
MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SEcuRITY LAW 777 (1990).
160. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n. 2 (Jackson, J.,
concurring); Lofgren, supra note 158, at 6-7; David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An
Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 468-69 (1946).
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Given Curtiss-Wright and its holding that the President has the
authority to initiate and conduct negotiations, the restrictions imposed by
the fast track procedure may be unconstitutional. Additionally, the
Jackson Vanik Amendment, to the extent it restricts the President's
negotiating authority, also may be unconstitutional. These provisions are
especially problematic when the President wants to use trade negotiations
as an adjunct to other foreign policy mechanisms, since the President has
undisputed authority in foreign affairs matters that do not involve foreign
trade.
A constitutional impasse on the issue of negotiating authority is
possible in the very near future. For instance, the Clinton Administration
may encounter congressional resistance to its proposal to negotiate with
the government of Chile for Chile's contemplated accession to NAFTA,
especially since Congress has yet to enact legislation delegating
negotiating authority to the President for this purpose. 1 ' The executive
branch's position is that fast track legislation is unnecessary to negotiate
an agreement, and that it is necessary only at "the moment before you
sign the agreement."'62 It is unlikely, however, that Congress and the
President will engage in a constitutional confrontation concerning this
new stage of NAFTA negotiations.'63
That the President has clear constitutional authority to conduct
negotiations with foreign officials does not end the analysis. There still
remain important questions on the authority to accept trade agreements;
the implementation of negotiated agreements as part of U.S. domestic
law; and the affect of agreements as or on domestic law. There is also
the question of whether Congress or the President can make substantive
trade policy. Arguably, the President may be able to control the process
of negotiations, but the substance of those negotiations may have other
constitutional influences.
C. The Power to Formulate Trade Policy
Although the President has the authority to negotiate freely with
foreign governments, the substance of the negotiations may be subject to
delimitation by Congress. As explained by one legal scholar:
161. Representative Matsui Says Congress Will Pass New Fast-Track Legislation Next Year, I I
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1831 (Nov. 30, 1994); NAFTA "Amigos" Invite Chile to Begin Accession
Talks, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1914 (Dec. 14, 1994).
162. Representative Matsui Says Congress Will Pass New Fast-Track Legislation Next Year, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1831 (Nov. 30, 1994) (statement of U.S. Trade Representative Mickey
Kantor).
163. See id. The President plans to consult with Congress concerning Chile negotiations and new
fast track legislation is contemplated in 1995. Id
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[A]lithough the President alone can act in foreign affairs, the content
of presidential options is defined partly - and increasingly - by
congressional enactments and limited by constitutional strictures.
Hence, while it may be symbolically correct to say that the President
is the sole national "actor" in foreign affairs, it is not accurate to label
the President the sole national policy maker. It would be equally
inaccurate, however to cast the role of the Executive in foreign affairs
as exclusively instrumental; the President is surely accorded a more
vital role in foreign relations than that of a mere medium whose
charge it is to effect exogenously posited ends.'"
No clear guidance exists to determine when it is presidential or
congressional prerogative to make policy. Practice suggests that each
branch asserts authority based on reliance to various references to the text
of the Constitution.165 Moreover, Congress in the most recent fast track
legislation commingles negotiation and policy formulation functions by
providing negotiating authority in conjunction with detailed statements of
what it considers to be permissible negotiating objectives.
6
No meaningful judicial precedent exists on this issue. The
concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer 167 may provide guidance, although the decision does not
make a distinction between policy and action.
D. Constitutional Validity of Presidential Action
In Youngstown, the Supreme Court held that an executive order
issued by President Truman to seize steel mills during time of war
violated the Constitution.' In the constitutional confrontation that was
the subject of Youngstown, Congress had refused to promulgate
legislation permitting such seizures. 69  While Youngstown "has not
been considered a foreign affairs case,"'' 71 Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion has nevertheless become an oft-cited formulation for assessingthe
constitutionality of executive action in foreign affairs matters.'
7'
164. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219 (2d ed. 1988).
165. Id. at 219-24.
166. See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
167. 343 U.S. 578, 634 (1952).
168. Id. at 586-88.
169. Id. In Youngstown, steel workers went on strike due to a labor dispute during a time of
high demand for steel during the Korean war. Id. at 582-83.
170. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 314, n. 1 (1972), quoted in MOoRE
ET AL., supra note 159, at 773.
171. See, e.g., Letter from Walter Dellinger, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal
Counsel, to the Honorables Robert Dole, Alan K. Simpson, Strom Thurmond, William S. Cohen, 1,
3 (Sept. 27, 1994) (on file with the author).
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Accordingly, set forth below is an analysis of the President's authority to
act independent of Congress' current comprehensive trade legislation,
using the tripartite analysis of Justice Jackson in Youngstown.
1. Factor One: Pursuant to Congressional Authorization.-Justice
Jackson acknowledged that there is "a somewhat over-simplified grouping
of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may
challenge, his power ... " based on the fluctuation of powers between
Congress and the President.'72 Thus, Jackson delineated the first factor
for assessing executive power as follows:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be
said (for what if may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty.
If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually
means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks
power.'73
Through the Trade Act of 1974 and other trade legislation, Congress
has provided detailed delegations that concern both the substance and the
procedure for trade negotiations. Thus, when acting according to these
provisions, the President is acting pursuant to express congressional
delegation. In such situations, according to Justice Jackson, the President
is acting in his maximum capacity, as he is acting under both the
authority delegated to him by Congress and his inherent constitutional
powers to conduct foreign affairs.
174
2. Factor Two: The Zone of Twilight.-Justice Jackson designated
the second factor for assessing executive power as follows:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
have concurrent authority, or in which the distribution is uncertain.
172. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635.
173. Id. at 635-37.
174. See supra note 8, 156-60 and accompanying text. A related issue is whether the Congress
imposes too many standards and too many procedural restrictions on the President, namely whether
the Congress is encroaching upon presidential powers over foreign affairs. The principal justification
for congressional activity in the trade area is that the text of the Constitution provides Congress with
the authority. This justification, however, fails to address the issue of whether the President has
concurrent authority. No questions are definitively answered by referring to blanket statements of
the text of the Constitution.
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Thereafter, congressional inertia, indifference or acquiescence may
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent professional responsibility. In this area, any
actual test of powers is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law.
75
Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight" factor can not be easily applied
to trade contexts, as there is a substantial and aggressive congressional
presence in recent trade legislation, both on a substantive and a
procedural basis.'76 Congress may have exhibited indifference or
acquiescence in prior regimes of trade regulation, such as those existing
before 1962 or 1974, 7' but today's regime is one in which Congress
seeks if not to preempt the field, then at least to substantially control
it.17
8
3. Factor Three. The Lowest Ebb.-Justice Jackson prescribed the
third and final factor as follows:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the express or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain
exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power
at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution,
for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional
system. '179
A President's action on his own, outside of the realm of current trade
legislation, plainly is in the "lowest ebb." Applying this factor, one may
question whether the President can indeed act in contradiction to trade
legislation.
At a threshold level, Justice Jackson's third factor may be attacked,
at least as far as trade matters are concerned. As explained above,
Youngstown did not involve the foreign affairs power.' Several
scholars have suggested that "Justice Jackson's third hypothetical ought
to be reversed - extending foreign affairs powers of Congress and the
175. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
176. See supra part I1.E.
177. See supra part II.A.
178. See supra part II.E.
179. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38.
180. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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Senate no further than is essential to their execution. This, at any rate,
would be consistent with the understandings of Hamilton, Jefferson, and,
arguably, the early Madison."'' Limited support for this proposition
can be found in the concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Goldwater
v. Carter,8 2 a case where several Senators challenged President Carter's
decision to recognize the People's Republic of China and to withdraw
recognition of the Republic of China (Taiwan). As stated by Justice
Rehnquist:
The present case differs in several important respects from
Youngstown . . . In Youngstown, private litigants brought a Suit
contesting the President's authority under his war powers to seize the
nation's steel industry, an action of profound and demonstrable
domestic impact .... Moreover, as in Curtiss-Wright, the effect of
this action, as far as we can tell, is "entirely external to the United
States, and [falls] within the category of foreign affairs." ' 3
The problems with relying on Goldwater are two-fold: (1) Unlike the
context of recognizing foreign governments, Congress does have
enumerated authority within the Constitution to regulate foreign
commerce; and (2) It is widely understood that foreign trade has a
significant effect on the domestic economy.
Alternatively, one can accept Justice Jackson's analysis and rely on
some authority of the President that is entirely independent of Congress'
power. The specific question in the context of trade agreements is
whether the President may enter into a sole executive agreement in a
manner and in substance inconsistent with current trade legislation regime
of the fast track procedure and the Jackson Vanik Amendment.'84
While the scope of the President's power to enter into sole executive
agreements "has not been authoritatively determined",8 5 the widely
accepted view is that the President is the dominant authority in foreign
affairs, with powers far greater than Congress.8 6 The foundation of
this authority is inherent, afforded by Article II, Section I of the
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America."'8 7  Alexander
181. MOORE ET AL., supra note 159, at 773.
182. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
183. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004 (1979).
184. See supra part II.E.
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303,
cmts. i-j (1986).
186. MOORE ET AL., supra note 159, at 749-817.
187. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I. See TRIBE, supra note 164, at 210-11.
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Hamilton's view was that this statement reflects an affirmative grant of
power beyond the enumerated powers set forth in Article II of the
constitution.1' Hamilton's view has since become law.
I8 9
In contrast, congressional power exists only as specifically granted
in the Constitution.' 90 There are no inherent powers in the foreign
affairs area which are resident in the Congress, as the Constitution
provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States .... "
In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court spoke of the President's
powers in foreign affairs in sweeping terms. Justice Sutherland explained
in Curtiss-Wright that "[t]he broad statement that the federal government
can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to
carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in
respect of our internal affairs."' 92 As such, federal powers in internal
affairs were taken from the powers held by the states.'93 The states,
however, never possessed "international powers" or "external
sovereignty."' 94  The United States, rather, obtained powers in the
international realm from the British Crown. 195  In this analysis, the
President was found to have broad inherent authority to conduct
international relations on behalf of the nation.'96
Because these articulations of executive power are very broad, they
are often not very helpful in resolving specific cases. While there have
been a few additional court decisions on this issue, none provide clear
guidance. The case law does suggest the following parameters.
(a) Actions Within the Scope of the President's "Primary
Constitutional Authority."' 97-It has been suggested that presidential
188. See supra notes 144, 145 and accompanying text.
189. Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 118, 164 (1926); see Tribe, supra note 164, at 210-211. In
Myers, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft wrote that "[t]he executive power was
given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate,
and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed .... " Myers, 272 U.S. at 164.
190. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
191. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1; see Tribe, supra note 164, at 210.
192. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315-16.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 316-18.
195. Id. at 319-20. Cf In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-65 (1889) (holding that the President has
inherent authority in domestic and international affairs).
196. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20.
197. This language is suggested by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 n.4 (1986).
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action in the form of a sole executive agreement may be appropriate in
matters within the President's "primary constitutional authority."' 8
The President has considerable powers in the authority to recognize
foreign governments. 99  The power of recognition, moreover,
necessarily implies the power of "de-recognition."2 ° The Republic of
China controversy of the late 1970s provides ample authority for this
proposition.2"' These latent powers may furnish some inherent
authority over matters involving foreign commerce. In the de-recognition
of the Republic of China, President Carter decided to retain only
economic and cultural ties with Taiwan, while establishing exclusive
political ties with the People's Republic of China as the sole political
entity for the nation-state of China.202
The basic authorities for sole presidential authority over recognition
are United States v. Belmon2 °3 and United States v. Pink,"4 both of
which concerned the recognition of the Soviet government by the United
States government. In Belmont and Pink, the Supreme Court upheld the
Litvinov Assignment, a sole executive agreement between the United
States and the Soviet government assigning private claims, as an incident
to recognition of the Soviet government by the U.S. government.0 5
There is no direct constitutional argument against extending these
decisions to areas other than recognition, so long as these other areas are
within the President's primary constitutional authority., The following
explanation in Pink is encouraging:
The powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations
included the power, without consent of the Senate, to determine the
public policy of the United States with respect to the Russian
nationalization decrees . . . . That authority is not limited to a
determination of the government to be recognized. It includes the
power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of
recognition. Objections to the underlying policy as well as objections
to recognition are to be addressed to the political department and not
to the courts ... Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition
as settlement of claims of our nationals . . . certainly is a modest
198. Id.
199. Giraudo, supra note 121, at 937.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 182, 183 and accompanying text.
202. In contrast, in the case of the People's Republic of China, the President and some members
of Congress have at times sought to retain political ties while restraining trade due to human rights
concerns.
203. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
204. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
205. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-33; Pink 315 U.S. at 233-34.
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implied power of the President who is the "sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations." United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp . . . . Effectiveness in handling the delicate
problems of foreign relations requires no less. Unless such a power
exists, the power of recognition might be thwarted or seriously
diluted. No such obstacle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation
of relations between this country and another nation, unless the
historic conception of the powers and responsibilities of the President
in the conduct of foreign affairs . . . is to be drastically revised. It
was the judgment of the political department that full recognition of
the Soviet Government required the settlement of all outstanding
problems including the claims of our nationals. Recognition and the
Litvinov Assignment were interdependent.206
Thus, it appears that certain latent powers exist in the President's
primary constitutional authority. The Congress, however, has explicit
textual authority over foreign commerce. Thus, there still remains a
serious question as to whether foreign commerce is within the scope of
the President's primary authority, unless, as in Belmont and Pink,
authority over foreign commerce is clearly exercised by the President as
incidental to the exercise of one of his primary constitutional powers.
(b) PresidentialAction That Can Be Harmonized With Congressional
Action.-One principle of interpretation is that a federal statute should be
construed to avoid conflicts with international law or international
agreements.0 7 In Consumers Union of US., Inc. v. Kissinger,2"8 the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals upheld agreements between
the executive branch and foreign steel producer associations, in which
the steel producers agreed to voluntary import restraints. The Court held
that the President did not have to adhere to the 1962 Trade Act when
making these voluntary agreements.20 9 Consumers Union, although
limited in its scope, indicates that there may be as yet undefined classes
of agreements that do not fall within trade legislation.
A case which is somewhat of a counterweight to Consumers Union
is US. v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.,2t0 in which the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals found a sole executive agreement unenforceable under the third
Youngstown factor. The Court in Capps held that a Presidential
206. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-30.
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114
(1986).
208. 506 F.2d. 36 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
209. Id. at 144.
210. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1953).
13 DICK. J. INT'L L. WINTER 1995
agreement that did not comply with statute was unconstitutional because
"[t]he power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, not in
the executive or the court ,,2i
In Capps, the Supreme Court scrupulously avoided the issue of the
authority of the President to enter into agreements without following
applicable legislation.212 Thus, no Supreme Court guidance exists on
the subject, and the issue is unsettled.
Capps should not be considered determinative. The analysis in
Capps goes to far. The Court "finds the President has no power because
Congress does.,, 2 13  This zero-sum analysis would inevitably lead to
excessive friction between the branches. It would unduly limit the
President's power to act only where Congress has no power to
legislate. 214  This would lead to nonsensical results and rob the
President of significant power, as there is not much at all that the
Congress cannot deal with in legislation.2" Notably, Capps concerned
a "pure" trade agreement that had no relation to any other foreign policy
issues.2  The stark proposition of Capps will not work when the
President can refer to enumerated powers in the Constitution. The Court
in Capps creates a hierarchy of powers, namely that enumerated powers
are better than inherent powers, and that is not supportable in any
accepted analysis of the U.S. Constitution. 17
This "harmonization" concept suggests that areas exist for the
President to explore, outside of or complementary to trade legislation that
is in existence at any one point in time, in which the President may act
on his own authority. Harmonization, however, could be interpreted to
really be an aspect of Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight" factor, applied
when Congress has not legislated on a matter. Still it merits treatment as
211. Capps, 204 F.2d at 658.
212. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF - EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT - A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 165-66 (1983), quoted in JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM S. DAVEY, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 91-92 (2d ed. 1986).
213. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 178-82 (1972), quoted in LOUIS




216. Capps, 204 F.2d at 657.
217. The answer is that while the President has certain inherent powers under the
Constitution such as the power pertaining to his position as Commander in
Chief... and the power necessary to see that the laws are faithfully executed,
the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is not among the powers




a distinct situation since, as in Consumers Union, it applied where
Congress had promulgated significant trade legislation and could be said
to have preempted the field of regulation of enforceable trade agreements.
(c) Presidential Action as a Necessary Incident to the Resolution of
a Major Foreign Policy Dispute.-A standard similar to that of "primary
constitutional authority" was suggested in Dames & Moore v. Regan.'"
In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court upheld a sole executive
agreement in which the President suspended litigation against the Iranian
government and required U.S. persons with claims against the Iranian
government to adjudicate the resolution of their claims in the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal." 9 The requirements were part of an agreement
reached between the President and the Iranian government for the release
of U.S. diplomatic personnel held as hostages in the aftermath of the
overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979.220
In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court found no legislation
specifically delegating to the President the authority to suspend claims
and to impose a mandatory dispute resolution procedure upon private
claimants.22' The Court nevertheless upheld the agreement because (1)
claims settlement was determined to be "a necessary incident to the
resolution of a major foreign policy dispute," and (2) Congress
acquiesced in the President's activities, determined on the basis of
consistent legislative practice or silence on the subject.222  The
resolution of major foreign policy disputes are within the President's
primary constitutional authority, and this Dames & Moore standard thus
could be read as a subset of the Belmont and Pink standard.22 a
Moreover, Dames & Moore is similar to Consumers Union in the
sense that legislation in the disputed area at issue existed, which the Court
in Dames & Moore interpreted "in the looser sense of indicating
congressional acquiescence of a broad scope of executive action in
circumstances such as those presented in this case., 224 Although the
Court fit the Dames & Moore facts into Justice's Jackson's second "zone
of twilight" factor, the decision could be read to indicate broad deference
218. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
219. Id. at 654-58.
220. Dames & Moore also dealt with other issues, such as the nullification of attachments of
Iranian assets. The Court found these other actions to have been accomplished pursuant to
congressional authorization. Id. at 656, 673-74.
221. Id. at 688.
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 203-06.
224. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677.
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to the President when a matter is related to a significant foreign policy
matter. More to the point, Dames & Moore should not be read so
restrictively so as to prohibit the President from taking action inconsistent
with legislation when necessary to deal with a foreign policy crisis of
major proportions.
(d) Presidential Action Predominantly in the External
Realm.-Finally, since the President has great powers in foreign affairs,
another possible standard is that the President may be able to act on his
own, possibly in a manner in conflict with legislation, when a matter has
no appreciable link to domestic matters."' Of course, the advice and
consent requirement would still apply to treaties.226 This is a modest
proposal, given Pink and Belmont, in which arguably significant domestic
impact occurred in the process of recognizing the government of the
Soviet Union, an ostensibly external matter.227 The standard may not
be justiciable, however, because of the substantially increased
relationships between domestic and foreign affairs.22
E. Presidential Authority to Implement Negotiated Agreements as
Domestic Law
If the President can undertake certain activities in international trade
in a constitutional manner without the involvement or approval of
Congress, the question arises as to the domestic law effect of such
activities. The President does not have the ability to enact legislation in
our constitutional system.229 Thus, in the context of a sole executive
agreement, the President would have to make any such agreement either
self-executing or promulgate an executive order to implement it.230
Similarly, for other activities, such as the issuance of trade sanctions, the
President could implement such sanctions through executive order.
Congress, however, could simply enact subsequent legislation to
nullify Presidential action. A well-established hierarchical principle in
United States law, established in connection with the early MFN treaties,
is that a later act of Congress supersedes an earlier international
225. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text. See also Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 303 n. I1 (1986).
226. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
229. The Constitution directs that "[all legislative Powers . . . granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
230. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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agreement.23' It is doubtful in our constitutional system that a President
could then enact a subsequent executive order to nullify the legislation.
The President, if he stands on firm constitutional ground, could always
ignore the legislation as unconstitutional, and refuse to enforce it.
However, such activities appear excessively confrontational from a
practical standpoint.
IV. Conclusion
A separation of powers analysis could sustain the assertion that
Congress has the authority, through the command of legislation, to stop
the President's activities undertaken on the basis of his sole executive
authority. Such an argument places the executive and legislative branches
back at "square one." That is, there would still remain the question as to
whether trade legislation is an unconstitutional encroachment on the
President's authority. The branches would be presented with a
conundrum.
Supreme Court cases have indicated some potential standards for
when the President may possibly ignore legislation in the international
trade area and yet still act within the Constitution.232 These standards,
however, appear to merely seek to allow one political branch to exercise
its primary functions without undue encroachment on the primary
functions of the other branch, and do not adequately define the
parameters of the President's independent authority.
The difficulties with the standards, moreover, are procedural as well
as substantive. Can it be left to executive discretion to determine when
the President can ignore legislation? Presumably, the difficulty of the
judicial branch in defining the parameters for the President's inherent
constitutional authority in trade matters lies in the fact that the separation
of powers doctrine, despite having been given the status of law by the
framers of the Constitution, nevertheless remains a political theory.233
231. See supra part II.A. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 (1986).
232. See supra part II.E.
233. See Marino, supra note 127, at 217.

